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The collapse of the Penn Central and the Department of Transportation
proposal to abandon as much as twenty-five percent of the rail mileage
in the Northeast, and discussion of abandonment of substantial
mileage in the Midwest grain areas and in the prairie provinces of Canada
have stimulated interest in the question of appropriate governmental
policy in the area and alternative solutions. The Interstate Commerce
Commission has proposed a 34-car rule as prima facie evidence of justifi-
cation for abandonment; any line that originates and/or terminates less
than 34 cars per mile per year is presumed to be uneconomic. The Department
of Transportation tentatively suggested a substantially different rule:
traffic less than one million gross ton miles per mile of line is prima facie
2
evidence that abandonment is warranted. These rules are extremely differ-
ent; the D.O.T. rule would result in elimination of numerous branch lines
and some so-called secondary main l^nes in the country, while the I.C.C.
rule would sanction only a much smaller amount. Neither rule was derived
in any scientific fashion (the I.C.C.'s rule was derived simply from the
average of the estimate of the traffic necessary for costs to be covered on
some 39 lines approved for abandonment the preceding year) . Both agencies
The authors are indebted to Mr. Ben Allen for his suggestions.
Ex Parte No. 274 (Sub. no. 1).
2
The Canadian Royal Commission on Transportation (1961) concluded that
100,000 net ton miles per mile of track was the breakeven point for profitable
operation.
The D.O.T. plan for the Northeast region is based on a figure of
75 cars originating or terminating per mile of line.
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are pursuing the question further; D.O.T. has contracted with consulting
firms for several studies. Some writers have suggested that over half of the
railroad mileage of the country should be abandoned—a far more extreme
position than that of D.O.T.
Further analysis of the question requires initially a better under-
standing of abandonment decision making than appears in the literature.
There are several major aspects. What elements enter into the abandonment
decision making process by individual railroads? Are there additional
elements that should influence governmental policy toward abandonment? Are
there significant elements from the standpoint of individual communities or
areas not relevant from a national point of view? Is it possible to derive
a standard rule? Do the standard rule approaches thus far attempted con-
sider all the appropriate elements from a national policy standpoint?
DECISION MAKING BY THE RAILROAD FIRMS
The elements entering into decision making by the firms are different
for branch lines of major systems and independent roads.
Branch Lines of Larger Systems.
Management of a profit making enterprise will obviously reach the
decision to abandon a line when the net contribution of the line to the
firm's profits v that is, the excess of revenue attributable to the line over
costs attributable to the line, within the firm's planning horizon, dis-
counted to the present, is negative. Therefore operation will be continued only if:
Note Development and Evaluation of an Economic Abstraction of Light
Density Rail Line Operations (Washington: Federal Railroad Administration,
1973). The basic conclusions suggest that the minimum traffic necessary for
avoidance- of losses is typically in the range from 40 to 60 cars per
mile per year (p. 115).
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- excess of revenues attributable to the i line over costs
for which the line is responsible.
r « relevant discount rare-
t-i,...,N the firm's planning horizon.
The task of calculating this contribution, however, is not simple.
Revenues . The relevant figure on the revenue side (R ) is the amount
of revenue that will be lost if the line is abandoned. There are two
elements
:
1. Revenue from local movements both originating and terminating on
r it \the line (R.. j. This is negligible on most branch lines.
2. Revenue from traffic moving on the branch and on other lines of
the system (r ) > less the expenses of handling the traffic on the othersys
lines fc j« if: the revenue will be lost if the branch is abandoned.
v sys'
There are certain problems in this c lcuiation;
a. Will the traffic be lost or will it move from another point on
the line? If the rate from points on the branch and the junction with the
main line are the same, and if all of the traffic will be trucked to the
junction and move to the final destination at the same rate, obviously
if
the railroad loses no revenue at ail; R - 0. At the other extreme, the
sys
traffic may be lost entirely. More commonly, the revenue loss will be positive
less than the original because the rate from the junction to the destination
is lower.-
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b« What is the out-of-pocket cost [C ) of handling this traffic on
sy s'
the main line? Despite the work of and others, this is not easy to
ascertain; the cost functions of pa ticular railway lines are not known
with any degree of accuracy, Accordingly in its deliberations, the I.C.C.
assumes that the out-of-pocket: (marginal} costs are 50% of the revenue
t it -? t i
received (C * 8 / 2} , and the railroads apparently use similar figures
in their own calculations. 3ut this is extremely arbitrary. In some
instances, out-of-pocket costs will exceed the revenues if rates are below
marginal cost, as some studies suggest (e.g., movement of logs in Mississippi)
c. Will traffic nGt moving en the branch at all be lost
as a result of "spite 5 ' or "get even" effect ? A shipper on the branch has
grain elevators or other facilities on other lines of the railroad.
Annoyed at the loss of service on this branch, he may divert traffic from
his other locations away from the railroad. Or, he and other shippers,
fearful that the loss of chis branch foretells the abandonment of other
branches, may begin to plan to use ether forms of transport or to locate
new installation on other railway lines, waterways, etc. The amounts are
very difficult to predict, in part . ecause the actions reflect personal
attitudes of individual shippers and in part because threats of shippers
prior to abandonment may merely constitute strategic moves in bargaining.
The revenue equation is:
(2) R
Xt
« R*
£
+ iR
it:
- C
iC
I
loc { sys sysj
or
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(3) R
it:
* R^ + Rit:
IOC STL
where
it
R - revenues attributable to the branch line in period t.
it
R. ' ~ revenues from local traffic on the branch line in period t.
loc l
it
R * system revenues from traffic, moving on the branch line and
sys °
other lines of the. carrier that will be lost if the line is abandoned,
it
C ~ reduction in costs of system operation due to elimination of
sys
traffic generated on the branch and moving on other lines.
i T i 1 * ft*!
R - hO-,"" 0*«J a net revenue to the system from through trafficsn { sys sysi
attributable to operation of the line*
Costs.
! it
The relevant cost figure [C j is the sum of the costs that will be
eliminated if the branch is no longer operated. Obviously costs related to
original investment in the line are rot relevant; the capital has been
sunk and has no relevance for present decision making.
1. Costs of maintaining right of way to a level adequate for safe
I it
operation and Federal track standards C . Studies suggest that there
(_ tnv; j
is a minimum sum necessary regardless of the volume of traffic, with an
1
increase in expenditures necessary as traffic increases/' There is 4 of
The recent D.O.T. study noted above arrives at a figure of $2,335 per
mile plus $1.97 per mile per 1,000 gross ton miles per mile of track (p. 58).
Addition of maintenance superintendance, salvage value, and property taxes
brings the figure to $4,029 plus $3.09 per 1,000 ton miles per mile of road
(p. 67).
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course, a trade off between additional expenditures on track to allow higher
speeds and lower train operating costs at the higher speeds. Maintenance
is a high percentage of total costs an light traffic lines—nearly half on
many lines
t over half on some.
2. Equipment coses C : maintenance of equipment used on the line:
depreciation In the sense of decline cf salvage value of this equipment;
return on salvage value of capital invested in the equipment. The principal
equipment items include:
(1) Diesels. These may be used exclusively on the line or not. In
either instance, the relevant item is the amount total diesel
maintenance, depreciation and return on investment would be
reduced if the line were not operated.
(2) Caboose. The same considerations apply.
(3) Freight cars. Maintenance due to operation of the branch, and
depreciation and return on additional freight cars necessitated
by operation of the branch.
Since motive power and cabooses that are obsolete for mainline service can
be used on che branch lines, these osts may be much 3 ower than they would
appear to be on the basis of the system average for equipment.
3. Direct fuel and labor costs of operating trains on the branch
fc
ie
]
4. Per diem payment for use of freight cars of other lines resulting
from operation of the branch C . I and other equipment rentals.
,
I** J
5. Return on the net: salvage value obtainable from the line. The
principal item of salvage iC is from the rails, which may net typically

t
-
1 I$5,000 a mile after costs of recovery. The salvage value Is partly a
function of current scrap prices for steel. It is often impossible cc &i
the right of way: only lard previously used for station facilities and
switch yards has any value , and even this may be nominal in small,
2
declining towns. On rare occasions a governmental unit is willing to buy
the right of way for highway improvements.
Salvage value is likely to be only a small fraction of ths original cos
of construction of the line, which is, of course, not relevant for the decis:' a.
The rate of return is the rate which the funds can earn in other
investments of comparable risk,
6, Traffic solicitation and hilling cosr.s for the braach
i it]
line (C"j. If there are agents on the line, their salaries are eliminated;
t trj s
*
if all billing and solicitation were handled from other offices, the savings
may be slight.
7, Overall administrative and general expense
this figure cay be nil unless the branch is a substantial portion of
the entire system. In if the branch was the source of large losses,
it is possible that its elimination say result in higher salaries for top
executives—given >n these of the net earnings of the. system,
8, Taxes. The tic in taxes is not : figured.
There are thre
f it)(1) Railroz tirement T . These will of course be saved
{ rsj
on all wages eliminated.
' it)
C " I . Reduction in
The B.G.T. study uses a figure of $9,000 a aile. Other studies s
lower figures.
2
"The D.O.T. study estimates land value to be $5,000 per mile of road.
Serious question can be raised about the suitability of this figure.
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(2) Property and other local or state taxes, such as gross receipts
T
1 Pr,
actually paid on the property of the branch will be eliminated. But this
levies [TJ. If property is locally assessed and taxed, the amount
is rare; state assessment is usual, with heavy emphasis on capitalization
of earnings. Accordingly » the total property tax bill for the system will
likely remain unchanged (or could even increase, if the net earnings rise
as a result of elimination of an unprofitable branch) ; there is merely a
redistribution of payments among various local governments.
(3) Federal and state income taxes f "in If the line has actually
been responsible for lover overall profits, the income tax payments of the
system will rise, and the cost saving is a negative item. In other words,
If the system has been profitable, and paying normal Federal income taxes ?
almost half of the losses from the line has been offset, by reduced income
tax payments. If the overall system is showing a loss for tax purposes
before and after elimination of the branch, there is no change in income
tax liability.
There are two elements of addition to cose arising from abandonment:
Under railroad union agreements, persons
losing employment as & result of abandonment of a line are usually
guaranteed annual income equivalent to current pay up to four years
(or the number of years of sent, if less).
2. The cost of obtaining approval of a contested abandonment
f It!
1. Severance pay IC
I
c
1
I
t
ap;
This is a one time cost
Thus the detailed abandonment decision equation, in elaboration of
equation (1), may be expressed as follows; operation will continue only if

Nt»J
3 f it it it
{ ioc sn mv1+ri iT ;
- c
it:
- c
ic
- c^ - c" - ^
eq op pa isv tr
- C
it:
- l" - T tfc - T 1 tfc + C" >gn rs pr in so ) j ap
Two concluding observations are warranted. First, it must be seres:
that all items consist of changes that will occur if the line it; abandoned—
not allocated shares of revenue or cost items involving both the branch
and other lines. Use of cost accounting standards for allocation will
produce results seriously in error and lead to abandonment of lines that
should be retained. Secondly, decisions must be based en expected results
over a period of years, not the current or past years alone.. For exampl
if current maintenance standards on the line are good, it may be possibJ
to reduce maintenance substantially for several years, thus warranting
continued use of the line for several years rather than immediate
abandonment *
Unfortunately, however, d fficult to forecast revenues cad
costs over the forthcoming years with any assurance of accuracy. This is
particularly true if the volume of traffic is a function of the discovery
of new ore bodies in mines; fluctuation in worJ tetals or farm
products; changes in Forest Service policy r-ilatin3 to the cutting of
timber
—
quite apart from the usual problems of forecasting trends
business activity, the price level, and other items universal for ail
businesses. But a business firm, of necessity must operate on tl isis of
some probability calculus.
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There are severe! ways in which adjustments may be made for uncertain: :
by using a higher rate of discount than the current internal rate of
return; by using a she. ime period, that is, by omitting any potential
net gain from years beyond a figure less than the usual planning horizon;
or by reducing expected revenues in future years by a certain percentage.
In practice* in most decisions relating to abandonment, the uncertainty is
not too significant* there en little change in the trend of costs
and revenues over the last period of years and there is no reason to believe
that the trend will change, In such an instance, if the current year shows
a negative net gain and the trend is toward an increase in the loss, there
is no need tc consider future years in the equation stall. In other
instances, the uncertainty is highly significant—when there is a substantial
likelihood of major cfa and large, capital outlay (e.g., on a net? bridr
is required to keep the line in operation. Not infrequently the decision
to abandon has made when a large outlay of this type suddenly becomes
necessary.
An Indap. pad .
: the line involved is a sepa ite entity rathei than . ach or
subsidiary of a raaj. LIroad, ire certain differences in che
calculation:
t t t
I. Revenue (R. ) . " I Lly calculated, since 5. ~ IL ; the
' loc
entire revenue Iway operations will cease. There is no question
about contribution to system revenues; only the revenues directly received
by the road are relevant. This suggests that an independent road will be
For one of many examples i the Union Pacific f s abandonment of its
Sherman County branch in Oregon after floods washed ouc a major portion
of the line.
2
,In uhis section Is are omitted as reference is being made to a
separate railroad.
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abandoned sooner than a branch, other things given, since there is no system
contribution. But in fact the revenue is a function of the rate division,
and the major road will presumably adjust the rate division to give the
independent line at least a portion of this system net contribution in
order to keep it in operation.
2. Cost. The cos" is much more simply calculated than for a branch;
the cost items are those the company incurs as a result of operation of
the railroad, including opportunity costs to it, such as interest on
salvage value. There are certain differences from the branch line case*
(1) Equipment costs
ment—maintenance, decline in salvage value, return on salvage value. Since small
roads frequently do not own freight cars, there are no depreciation or return on
investment charges for these items. Freight car maintenance is limited to emergency
repairs on other lines' cars. The principal equipment item is the motive power.
C . These are the costs incurred by the road on equip-
(2) Because freight cars are not usually owned by the line, per diem
f
expenses !c id to be higher relative to traffic.
{ P
.
) Billing and other traffic solicitation expenses and general
administrative expenses C and C" These must be covered in full.
{ tr
(A) Taxes. Losses on the line cannot be used cc offset profits on
the system as a whole; thus there is ssibility of a negative income
tax
through carry-back of losses). Furthermore, there will be a net saving of
property tax
f t )
T. figure (except for refunds on previous years' taxes
from abandonment. Desnite the tendency of the states to
or
f
p
assess railroads on the basis of capitalization of earnings, a minimum
assessment per mile is universally used, so that some property tax is paid
regardless of losses.
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A new element in decision making becomes potentially significant if there
is sharp separation of ownership and management. Management, anxious to
protect its position, will seek to cortinue operations almost indefinitely
*
and if the owners are not aware of the actual earnings situation, the
decision will not be made at the economically optimal time. This is not
common with small roads but does occur.
It must also be recognized that nonpecuniary considerations may enter.
The owners may be willing to sacrifice income because of "prestige" con-
siderations and may be very reluctant to admit defeat and failure. Tney
may seek to avoid loss of the satisfaction they receive from keeping the
trains moving. This type of consideration is very rare with a branch of a
major system.
The basic equation is similar to that for branch lines, though the
determinants of the components differ; operation will continue only if:
N
(5) I
t«i
f 1 1* f t t t t
—
-
r, - c - c - <r - c
1+rJ
: cloc tag eq op pd
.
pt jc .,t . _,t ,c ^t
isv tr gn ra pr in
+ C
C
>
ap
T t" f~
recognizing that C , C , C. . C" , and the T items represent actual
eq op tr gn"
payments by the firm rather than decreases that will occur in system
expenses if a branch i& abandoned.
The Constraint: Availability of Funds to Meet Deficits .
Regardless of expectations about future improvements and the desire cf
management to retain its jobs, continued operation of an independent road
There are no severance pay obligations when an entire line is abandoned
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is contingent upon the availability of funds (W) to meet cash flow deficits.
Initially there may be liquid reserves (L ) ; the reports filed with the
I.C.C. repeal that many Class II roads have substantial liquid investments*
Secondly, sale of unneedcd equipment and land can bring in cash to meet
].
deficits (U ). Thirdly, some money may be obtained by loans (L ).
Finally, the owners themselves may be willing to provide the funds
Thus the equation showing the constraint isr
(6} W-L+U+L+C
r o wn
The potential will vary greatly among individual roads. But many will reach
the point at which no further funds are available from any source; history
provides a number of examples of roads that ceased only when they could nc
longer raise funds to meet cash flow deficits, and of others that survived •
the depression cf the 'thirties only by the grace of fuel suppliers who
did not press for payment of long overdue bills, by selling everything
that could be sold, and dvances from shippers who sought to keep the
line in operation.
The relevant equc-c^cn Including the liquidity constraint for the
abandonment decision cf an sr.tire rose. Ln simplified form, therefore
each relevant year is as folicw-s: operation will continue each year only if:
(7)
N \r 1 \ t
>
£ I |T?r
t-i U J l
L. ""X % - c m * • 4» < ™
EL - CL
1 j
+ W. >
Technically this is true with branch lines of major systems but the
issue seldom arises in practice, so long as the branch is a minor element
in the svstem.
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SOCIAL VS. PRIVATE BENEFITS: BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
Analysis on the basis of social benefits and costs must be made
separately for national and subordinate-unit policy making; the local
community will ha used as a representative or the latter.
Cost-Benefit _AaaJ yj5is_j:roia_, • onal Sta ndpoint
.
There are several elements that appropriately enter into the decision
on abandonment of a particular line from the standpoint of national society
as a whole, that is, in society's cost-benefit decision making 4 that are
not relevant to the private firm;
a. The possible need for use of shadow prices, If prices paid by a
carrier for particular factor units differ from what may be regarded as
the real economic cost of the activity, optimal society decisions require
the use of shadow prices reflecting economic costs, rather than actual cost.
The most likely instance, and one that requires consideration in abandon-
f itl
ment cases j relates to train operating labor \C !. The railroad industry
is characterized by extremely strong unionization, a wage system for
operating personnel developed a century ago involving numerous rules that
lessen flexibility in the us« a, irj and a tendency for the unions to
seek to require larger train crews ... i management regards as necessary
for safe end efficient operation. The effect may be to increase costs of
train operation on light traffic. :antially above, the real economic
costs. If a train can be operated satisfactorily on a light traffic line
with a two-man craw rathei m four or five, the wages paid to the additie
two or three men are not necessary economic costs but merely reflect union
power and tactics in the particular field- If rules prevent attainment of
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a standard number of hours of work for a day f s pay comparable to that in
other types of work (with the daily wage rate comparable to that in
similar fields);, again the coses are artificially inflated.
it it it
Therefore, C < C where C. * the real economic cost of train operation,
opr op opr
A more debatable question arises when service on a line requires
operation of trains only a few days a week. Whether continued
operation of the road is economically justifiable may depend upon the
feasibility of hiring operating crews on a part-time basis—either perform-
ing other tasks for the firms in the remaining time or having other employ-
ment so that their annual incomes are comparable to those in similar lines
of employment. Again, if union rules or other circumstances prevent this
and require a level of payment for two days of work that provides an
acceptable annual income s the use of shadow prices is necessary.
Any difference between C * and C "' is likely to differ greatly
opr op
among various light traffic carriers. Even when Class II roads are
unionized, the rules are often much more liberal than those applied to
Class I roads y nnd many Class II roads are not unionized at all.
This issue has been ignored Ir virtually all .discussions of abandon-
ment because of 8 tendency to regard union agreements as sacrosanct. But
from the standpoint of ascertaining economic costs the element must be
included.
b. Contribution to the net revenues of the railroad network as a
whole. As noted, an element considered in abandonment decisions for par-
ticular branch lines is the net contribution of the branch to the revenues
:]
9nJ
it^
the particular railroad system aa a whole JR j. But no attention is paid
Class I railroads
s by I.C.C. classification, are those with annual
revenues in excess of $5 million; Class II, those below this figure.

-16-
to the contributions to other railroads. Shipment of grain on a branch
line of the Santa Fe in central Kansas, bound for Georgia, will contribute
very little to the system revenues rf the Santa Fe, but a substantial
it
amount to the southeastern roads who carry it most of the way. Thus R
sii
it it it
of equation (2) becomes R . as R > R when there is more than one
an nn sn
railroad involved in shipments to or from the line in question, where
it
R " « the net gain to the national railroad network from the operation of
nn
the line.
Failure to recognise the "national system'* implications of light
traffic lines could result in piecemeal uneconomic disintegration of the
railroad system as a whole. As feeders are lopped off successively, traffic
f
on remaining lines falls, thus leading to the abandonment of still more lines.
If one accepts the. extreme John G. Kneiling-George Hilton position that the
railroad system should be drastically curtailed to a few heavy traffic
routes, this argument has no validity* But this point of view is open to
serious question.
c. Bridge traffic. Socu± light traffic, lines carry some "bridge"'
traffic, neither originating not te: ninating on "he line, which will
move by alternate the line is abandoned. Therefore the net
\ it it]
national gain to die line from handling the bridge traffic *L - C
less the additional cost from handling the Effic on the next best route
f Jtl
IC:* must be deducted in the evaluation of the line Thus the adjustment
I
b ) n , ~\
If* i11 it! it
is to subtract from revenue: MR, - CI - C3 or, for simplicity R'.
!
i d b j b ! * 'on
Li
1
An excellent example was provided by the Midwest electric interurban
railways. Each abandonment seriously weakened the remaining connecting line.
In this instance, however, continuation would not have been economically
justifiable for the entire system, But disintegration may have occurred
sooner than it would have if one firm had owned all of the lines,
2
See, for example , John G. Kneiiing, "Price, Cost, and the Bottom Line,'
Trains
„ March 1973, p. 5.
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d. Inability to use perfectly discriminatory rates. Usual abandon-
ment decisions are made, on the basis of the existing rate structures. But
these structures raay involve underpayment by some shippers,, in the sense
that they would be willing to pay more and still ship the same or nearly
the same quantities. Alternatively, some firms not now using the line
might do so if somewhat lower rates were offered. But this type of rate
adjustment is essentially impossible for an independent railroad even where
the commodities are different, since the key decisions must be made by the
major systems. And even a major system may be unable to make the adjustment
because of repercussions upon other rates and the widespread acceptance of
general rate schedules that involve identical rates from and to wide areas.
Even if the railroad seeks to make the change the I.C.C. may not allow it.
But even more fundamental is the legal and practical inability of the rail-
roads to charge different rates to different shippers of the same commodities.
Suppose that a line serves several copper firms, all producing copper bars but
from ore of widely differing quality. A rate that allows most of the mines
to ship will result in payment of much less than the potential amount from
the high grade mines, and bar the marginal mines from operating. Yet there
2
is no effective way that the rates can be differentiated- But in the
decision with regard to abandonment, the relevant revenue figure is one
based upon perfect discrimination—even though such rates cannot be charged.
1
This question is explored in the Symposium on Economic and Public
Policy Factors Influencing Light Density Rail Line Operations (Washington
:
U. S. Department, of Transportation, 1973),
2
There has been soroe exploration of possible voluntary surcharge,
See statement by J. R. Sullivan, "A Carrier's Perspective/' in Symposium
5ILli§!i.^^£eiisi,^Z_J-lM^c Lines , op. c i t « , pp. 28-32.
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This is not to say that all such revenue should in fact accrue to the rail-
road if the rates could be charged, since the railroad requires only an
average return on investment. The figure Is, however, the relevant one
for cost-benefit analysis of abandonment decisions. Thus in equation (2)
>it
_,_ „it , _lt
Rj replaces R ", where R* ' - the revenue obtainable with perfectly dis-
criminatory rates.
e. Externalities. To the extent that a light traffic line yields
positive externalities, primarily by reducing highway congestion and need
for more highway construction and air and noise pollution, and makes more
effective use of energy in a period in which energy is scarce at existing
prices, an element must be included on the revenue side for the value, of
f itlthese externalities E !. The amounts are. in all such instances, diffi-
cult to estimate, but even a rough estimate is preferable to none.
There may, of course, be negative externalities, such as the losses
from delays and accidents at grade crossings, the value of which must be
subtracted from revenues or added to costs.
f. Taxes. To the extent that taxes reflect economic costs for which the
line is responsible, they are obviously appropriate elements in cost. Thus
railroad retirement taxes may be so regarded and local property taxes to a degree
(to finance police and fire protectioi nd other activities offering direct
benefit to all property holders). But beyond this, the taxes paid basically
reflect the form of tax structure employed, rather than real economic costs.
This is certainly true, for example,, of" the portion of property tax used
to finance, schools, and of the income tax. It is possible, of course , to
argue that if the profits made from other activities are subject to income tax,
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that from railways must be as well to avoid distortion of resource alloca-
tion. Similar reasoning does not apply to the property tax, which burdens
the railroads disproportionately (relative to revenue) to other forms of
business.
In view of these aspects 'late property tax element in the equation
becomes T , consisting of property tax payments that are. actually user
ph
charges j but; not the remainder.
C it 1
g. Severance pay. The appropriate item C^ is the real loss to
employees from termination of this employment, rather than contractual
f It)
severance pay C
{ spj
h. Longer range considerations. If a line is abandoned, the costs cf
reconstructing it are extremely great, relative to the costs of continuing
to maintain the line, If* for example, it is obvious that the depressed
revenues are a product of temporary considerations--such as depressed
prices for the minerals produced in the area---but with good long range prospects,
clearly there is justification from the standpoint of society to retain
the line—-even though it may not be. possible or desirable for the private
owners to do so. Society has access to funds to eliminate the liquidity
constraint, and the time ton can be much longer.
i. The discount rate.. The discount rate appropriate for society (rs)
decision making may appropriately be less than that used by the firm.
It may be argued that; risks are less for society than for a firm."
The appropriate formula therefore becomes- for continued operation;
N
(8) I
t«l
1
ioc-d nn-d xn bn mw eq opr
pd isv tr gn rs pb in sprj
J
ap
1
This question is discussed at length in E. J. Mishan, Economics for
Social Decisions (New Yorks Praager, 1972), Chapter 26.
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Communicy Cost~Bene fit Considerations
.
The analysis thus tar has bean, concerned with national considerations*
But when viewed frci standpoint ">f the particular area or communities
served by the rail line involved, the relevant elements are somewhat differ-
ent. The basic difference is that retention of a rail line serving a group
that areLitof communities may offer certain advantages to those communities E°
( xc,
not benefits from the yr.andpcint of the country as ?. whole, and may in fact
be disadvantageous.
Abandonment of the line may result in substantial effect upon the
growth of a community.*" Thus some individuals will suffer in the sense
that their personal wealth will be less than otherwise* over and above the
amount shippers would be willing to pay in higher rates, as reflected
in the figures of revenue with perfect rate discrimination. Property values
will fail: employment opportunities will be less; retailers will suffer
declines in volume below the figure allowing a profit to be earned, The
ability of the community ( e new industry will be impaired. Some of
the losses are illusor; some firms lose business and quit, others will
again be able to earn necessary profits. But nevertheless people of a
community as a wholo ^o^r-on el that c ill be injured
—
quite apart
from the prestige c:raider in. of population and
output. None of thz? c- changes ara of national concern, except to the extent
1
For example, preservation or the line may result in continued
distortion of location of production.
2
Evidence of the actual effects where abandonment has occurred is
not available but is the subject of current study.

that production would be more efficient in this locality than in
others.
On the other hand, some of the considerations of national scope will
not appear to be significant from the standpoint of the people of the
community—-the contribution of the. line to the national rail system,
for example., or externalities benefiting persons:- in other areas. Other elements
are relevant from both local and national viewpoints: energy conservation
and pollution, for example.
The significant formula for abandonment, considering both local and
national interest, becomes as follows; continued operation is justified if:
N V( 1 1* f 4
til ! [***} [ loc-d
+ V-d + Exn + Lxc * \nL
_
it „it it it
raw 30 opr pd
pit
-it
_it
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where 5T
c
reflects additional externality benefits to the community
over and above those to trie national society
. E
it
and s
lt:
must be
xc
J
"xn
interpreted in such a way that no double counting occurs
The severance pay item, C^
, is relevant, from society's standpoint,
whether the line is a branch or a separate road. The appropriate figure,
however, is the loss to the employees through loss of their jobs, if any,
rather than any contractual severance pay sum.

Use of this formula would result: in retention of some lines that from
a strictly national point of view are uneconomic, because the gains to
the community are of such nature tht they are offset by losses to other
communities in the sense of their inability tc get industry away from the
ones on the line. But elimination of this? element from decision making
is to deny to each community tl Lvilege of supporting lines that are
advantageous from point, Still, national subsidy of this element
is clearly unwarranted.
The Standard Formula Studies,.
As noted, the I.C.C. and D.O.T. been searching for a standard
rule that can be applied in all ir es as prima facie evidence of the
case for or against abandonment.. Such a formula is of course based on
the assumption that costs cannot be reduced below certain amounts per mile,
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Derivation of such a formula requires an analysis of the cost functions
on light traffic lines. But the studies undertaken so far are based solely
upon cosr.s and revenues for the lirr s . without regard for the national and
community cons - .3 noted above and without regard to possible cost
and reve inferences ui the alternatives Lonment. Thus
any conclusions from these studies as now conceived by l.C.C. and D.O.T.
are like! onment of a number of
lines whose eo ition is if all elements are taken into
isideration.
It is» of course, recognised by both l.C.C. and D.O.T. that conditions
vary widely among different lines, and thus no standard figure, however
well derived, co.n give universal answers. Some of the major sources of
variation in the amount of traffic necessary for the retention of various
lines includ
1. The nature of the traffic and thus the potential rate level at
which the traffic can move.
2. extent of s operations necessary.
inability of back h ul traf ic Many II roads and
branch lin tajor systems suffer ly from lack of back haul
traffic,
4. Topography and rainfall, etc., ffect
maintenaa
5. The standards to e line was built and maintained over the
years.
6. The possibility of nonfreight revenues. Some Glass II roads have
developed profitable tourist traffic.
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i ; to abani viT
Questions nment policy arise when abandonment is warranted
from the standpoint tie indivi firm but net from the standpoint
of the national economy, the local community, or both. In the past this
issue was never faced; if in the o I.CC. the losses to the
shippers znd the comraur- 1 the losses to the railroad, the
railroad was required to keep th -ration. Su^.h a policy is,
of course* irrational and often self aestrucriva. No company will be
concerned with continuing peration a line which in its calculation is
losing money. Such a policy transfers the burden to other shippers and to
the stockholders of the company—neither of which is appropriate. In
the case of an entire line such a 3 Ley is impossible and there is no
alterative to abandon,
The e several pose 'rimary alternatives, in addition to
readjustments in rate to bring the rate closer to perfect dis™
criminatic
Transfe , ine t parate Local Firm .
As sugge /ibeve, any cases, local operation allows lower cost
operation than is r-ajcr system; the net position
in equation (4) is greatc tion (5). The primary differ-
ence lies in labor cosls; th may have much greater flexibility
in the v. labor as r labor productivity•, and yet pay annual wages
its erapi nitive with other f orrns oi employment. In other
words, C ~ C . There is greater likelihood of being able to hire
opr op &
employees for train operation for a part of a work week only, as noted

-25-
above. Likewise, by adapting service more satisfactorily to the interests
of the shipper, and by appealing to the shippers to use the railroad instead
of trucks when there is little difference in overall costs, it may be
possible to gain more traffic.
This alternative offers greatest potentiality if the new company is
owned by the principal shippers, as is not infrequently the case. By
this means some of the community benefits are internalized into the firm
and therefore affect the decision making of the firm or, in other words,
the net effect may be to bring the actual costs of making shipments
closer to those of perfect discrimination. The shippers may
suffer substantial losses if the line is abandoned
—
yet the additional
amounts they would be willing to pay to keep the line in operation cannot
be recovered by the railroad, per se, through rate differentiation, as
own the line and
noted. But if the various firms/ provide capital roughly in proportion to
the potential gains to them from continued operation, the losses will be
borne (through failure to earn a return on this capital or through volunt^
assessments against stockholders to meet deficits) more or less equal to
the amounts they would be willing 1 i pay in additional rates. Thus the need
for subsidy & per se, js avoided or minimized. Furthermore, a shipper-owned
line offers greater potentiality for using train crew personnel in other
jobs in the periods in which the trains are net operated and in maximizing
use of the railroad instead of other forms of transport where the costs
are comparable.
This occurred, for example, when the owners of the Amador Central sought
to abandon it in 1938. Shippers acquired the line and continued to operate
it. Thirty-five years later the road continues to show an operating profit.
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In other respects, as noted, a local firm is at a disadvantage coat-
wise, since the line must cover its own administrative costs—although
shipper-owned lines can minimize trls if their own managerial personnel can
manage the railroad as well. As noted above, also, the property tax cle-
ment becomes an expense for which the line is responsible. From the revenue
side, likewise, the road cannot obtain the benefits of the system contri-
bution. But to the extent that it can extract an amount roughly equivalent
to this from the major road through rate divisions, the situation becomes the
same as with a branch of a major system.. The ability to negotiate this
division at the time of transfer of ownership of the branch is important to
its survival. A division of rates that gives the system contribution to
the road can of course be brought about by regulatory action if necessary.
But even the independent road cannot realise financially from uhe
national or community externalities or the net contribution to the national
railroad system or benefit fully from perfect rate discrimination. If the
line is not self supporting, but continued operation is justified s subsidi-
zation is necessary—as it would also be for a branch of a major system if
costs are lover with continuation cJ the line a branch.
Local Community Subsidy and/or Operation
»
As noted, even a local firm carnot realize financially from ail of the
local externality benefits. Accordingly, local subsidization from tax
revenues, either with private or local government ownership and operation,
is justified if continued operation is. warranted on the basis of the criter:' i
noted above. If the subsidy to a private firm could be baaed on the value of
the community externality benefits, this approach is satisfactory. But in

fact since these benefits are difficult to measure, the tendency is to
determine the subsidy by t :' : the :it—either in full or
part. If the entire deficit, is covered, incentive to gain revenue, to hold
down costs,and to ma eliminated. If only
a portion of th i there ia v.o national subsidy) a
local line cannot cor.rz ». If :he line is not operated by a
local firm but as a branch of a major system and the deficit is not fully
covered, the will los Jt in continued operation even though
It can continue to operate the line.
lerefoi *en the difficulties of measuring the value of the exter-
nalities as a b for determining the amount of subsidy, there is sub-
stantial merit in operation of the line by a local governmental unit—city,
county, special i ty, or the state if the line is of state-
wide concern. In addition to avoidinj this fundamental problem, cal
government operation offers >ther advantages as well:
1. It may be Lble for a governmental unit to ate with lower
costs than a private fir,- il> lower on by a major
system- By using usual c 4 vtl service wor rds and p • :he
guarantees o ence of 11 service, it is more
to avoid inf'i... a of employees and the payment of
full day v s ;- y's 'work- ;: ' ere Is no guaran
that: these results will be obi 2 able, politically and
otherwise, to block these adjustments. The tth
i
however, does have
relatively strong bargaining position on such matters if a subsidy is re-
quired; the .legislative body or the voters may simply refuse to provide
the subsidy unless maximum utilization of employees is attained.
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2. Data of costs are much more realistic than they may be with
private fir:ns. With the latter the e is always dange" of the padding of
certain cost items—such as salaries of the officials when they are also
the principal owners— if deficits are to be made up from subsidies.
Examination of the "general and administrative" categories of the expenses
of Class II railroads reveals a very high degree of variation relative to
revenue, a variation That suggests the conclusion that they do not all
reflect necessary costs,
3. A built-in Federal subsidy is obtained in years of profits because
the railroad will not pay Federal income tax. Thus in profitable years
a larger sum can be used for capital improvements or saved for future use.
4. Local property taxes are avoided, under the property tax laws of
most states. Thus one artificial element in cost is removed— the non-
benefit related portion of the property tax. Beyond this, the exemption
may also be regarded as a built-in subsidy. If the railroad is operated
an existing governmental unit, the tax loss may be offset by che earning
of a profit* If revenues do not permit doing so, collection of property
tax would be self-defeating, if the subsidy is financed from this tax. With
governmental units other than the one operating the line and obtaining the
profits, if any, the net effect is an intergovernmental transfer of revenue—
which may be questioned on the grounds of general intergovernmental fiscal
policy, although it is not necessarily objectionable.
5. Public ownership by the community internalizes to the railroad all
community benefits rather than those to shippers alone, as with local
ownership. Ownership and operation of the line by a governmental unit
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increases the concern of local shippers about the welfare of the line,
especially if they will pay higher taxes to meet a deficit.
Cn the negative side of the picture is the dange:: that a government
operated line will suffer higher costs through lessened incentive toward
efficiency and selection of personnel on a political patronage basis. This
danger can easily be exaggerated; if deficits will mean higher taxes,
there is strong incentive on the part of the governing body to seek to
insure efficiency.
If despite lower costs and the built-in tax avoidance subsidies, the
line cannot cover costs but continued operation is regarded as warranted,
the difference must be made up from local tax revenues. If much of the
benefit accrues directly to a few large shippers, and much of the
justification for continued operation arises out of the failure of the rate
structure to obtain the full amount these shippers would be willing to pay,
there is merit in the use of a tax that will obtain a large share of the money
from these shippers—if this is possible. Feasibility of such a tax will
make the proposal for subsidy much more appealing to the taxpayers of the
community. But such a tax may be difficult to devise, given legal and
practical constraints. When the benefits are more widespread, involving
more jobs, greater total wage payments, and sales for retailers, and sub-
stantial importance is attached to the prestige and luring future industry
considerations, there is justification for use of broad based taxes, and
such taxes are likely to gain political support under the circumstances.
Regardless of the form of tax, there Is great merit in giving the
local governmental unit operating the railroad its own taxing powers, so that
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any deficit that must be made up will necessitate a separate tax levy by
the unit itself. This approach allows the people of the community a better
opportunity to indicate their estimates of benefits and costs. To make the
unit dependent on subsidies from other local or state governmental units
increases the danger, as with private firms, on the one hand, of lessened
pressure to maintain efficiency, and on the other, of inability to plan
improvements and scheduling because of uncertainty about whether the subsidy
will be forthcoming. The expeLience of the Chicago Transit Authority (which
has no taxing powers) illustrates most effectively the difficulties with
this approach. In some instances, however, state subsidy may be necessary
as a second best alternative because of inadequacies in local tax sources.
A program of local subsidization alone, while preferable to no program,
is seriously inadequate. First, some of the items entering into the policy-
decision equation are of national but not local concern, particularly the
contribution to the rail system of the country as a whole and the exter-
nalities affecting persons in other areas. Secondly, local tax sources are
limited by both economic and legislative constraints. It is difficult to
adjust the tax in such a way as to avoid substantial burden on persons in no
way interested in the project and thus political support is lessened.
Secondly, there is a strong dielike in virtually all communities of further
increases in the principal local tax— the property tax. Frequently refusal
of voters to approve projects to be financed in part by the property tax is
basically a vote of protest against this tax rather than against the
project, per se, which would be supported with other forms of tax.
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National Subsidy
.
Because of the limitations noted in the previous paragraph, there is
strong justification for Federal si bsidy to compensate for items of purely
national concern and of more or less universal but noncompetitive local
concern—noncompetitive in the sense that gains to one community are not
offset by losses to another. These national items include:
1. Excess cf actual wages over appropriate shadow wages, where the
differential reflects national labor contracts over which persons of the com
munity have no influence.
2. Contributions of the line to the net revenue of the national rail
network.
3. The difference between actual rates and perfectly discriminatory
rates, in excess of the portion of this sum that can be obtained from the
shippers with local operation.
4. Universal externalities, such as lessening of pollution and
conservation of energy.
National subsidization also encounters difficulties. If the subsidy
can be determined on the basis of ; le actual measure >f these national
concerns, there are few objections. But if in practice, the Federal
government simply subsidizes by the amount of the deficit, as in Canada,
2
or a portion of the deficit, as in the new Northeast railroad legislation
in the U. S. (70%), the usual dangers of subsidization are encountered.
Complete covering of the deficit would eliminate all pressure to hold costs
H. L. Purdy, Transport Competition and Public Policy in Canada
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press), 1972, Chapter 15,
2
PL 93-236, 1974.
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dovm—whether the operation is private or local government. Partial,
if operation is by a private firm, will result in abandonment if a single
company is involved and complete neglect of the line if a major company is
involved, since the company is being forced to operate a facility that is
reducing its profit. There is no simple solution to this problem; the
70-30 formula of the new federal legislation, with local public operation of
the line, is a reasonable compromise, given the informational constraints,
although admittedly the figure is arbitrary.
As suggested in the previous discussion, a program of national subsidy
alone, based on measurement of the items of Federal concern, is inadequate
for optimality because purely local interests are neglected, while national
subsidy of 100% of the deficit would cause loss in efficiency. Accordingly,
local subsidization is required as well, to compensate for elements of purely
local concern. Operation by local units which have their own taxing powers
lessens the danger of efficiency loss.
INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Determination of whether a particular rail line should be retained or
abandoned requires the following information:
A. Revenue:
1. Revenue currently attributable to the line, including the net
contribution of the line to the revenue of the national rail-
road system as a whole.
2. An estimate of the additional sum the shippers using the line
are willing to pay, over what they are now paying, to retain
the line.
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3. An estimate of the additional amount communities served are
willing to pay in the interests of continued service, over
and above the amount shippers are willing to pay.
4. The value of any national externalities resulting from
retention of the line.
B. Costs:
1. The costs for which the line is responsible, as outlined
above, including:
a. Maintenance of way at a level necessary for continued operation.
b. Maintenance of equipment, Including return on salvage value.
c. Train operating expenses.
d. Traffic, general, and administrative expenses.
e. Equipment rental.
f
.
Taxes
.
g. Return on salvage value of the line.
2. Adjustment of these cost items in instances in which economic
costs and actual costs differ, with use of shadow prices where
necessary:
a. Possible use of shadow prices for labor.
b. Consideration of whether or not management has reached
efficiency levels comparable to other railroads. Comparison
of costs of this road and similar ones is desirable.
C. Comparison of revenues and costs, thus determined, over a period
of years, discounted to the. present, in the usual cost-benefit
fashion. Evaluation of the desirability of retention of a line
is facilitated by a knowledge of cost functions on light traffic
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lines and the minimum volume of traffic essential if continuation
is to be justified, under the circumstances in which the road
operates.
D. Evaluation of alternatives. If management seeks abandonment, but
cost-benefit analysis suggests that retention is warranted, data
for exploration of the alternatives is necessary:
1. Comparison of actual costs of operation as a branch of a main
line vs. an independent local road. This comparison will be
facilitated by analysis of actual experience, involving com-
parison of:
a. Actual costs of operation of branch lines of major systems
with operation of local companies, where traffic volume,
distance, and other characteristics are similar.
b. Ascertainment of changes in costs when a branch line has
been sold to a local company for operation.
2. Comparison of costs of operation by a local governmental unit
rather than a local company.
This analysis is. acilitated by stuay of comparative costs
of lines actually operated by governmental units. The one
study of this character (of the City of Prlneville Railway)
suggests that costs of the municipal line compare very favorably
1
with those of comparable Independent local roads,
3. Analysis of the potential effects of shift to local ownership
or to governmental operation upon revenues.
1
J. F. Due and F. Juris: Rails to the Ochoco Country: The City of
Prineville Railroad (San Marino: Pacific Books, 1968).
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CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion: The task of evaluating the desirability of retention
of a particular line of railway on a cost-benefit basis is not a simple
one. Several generalizations about past and present policy can be made:
1. Abandonment based on management decisions alone are likely to
result in loss of substantial mileage that from a national standpoint
should be retained, and of still more that would be justified from a
regional standpoint.
2. The Interstate Commerce Commission has in a rough sort of way-
considered losses to the communities. But where it has decided that operation
must be maintained, it has been able to do so only by requiring continued
operation by the railway. This is objectionable from an economic stand-
point and likely to be self defeating.
3. The I.C.C. policy of requiring that a major carrier offer the
line for sale at salvage value to anyone who will seek to continue it in
operation is a highly desirable one. Earlier decisions refusing abandonment
and sale to local companies proved to be unwise.
4. The inability to attain perfectly discriminatory rates is a major
factor leading to abandonments not warranted from a national and community
point of view. Operation by a local shipper-owned company or a local
government allows a partial approximation to perfect discrimination and avoids
or lessens the need for an outright subsidy and often allows lower costs.
5. Operation of a line by a governmental unit provides important
b\iilt-in subsidies through avoidance of income and property taxes.
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6. If subsidization is required, optiraality requires that a portion
must be supplied by the national government because some of the externalities
are nationwide in scope and will nc •: be considered by the community, and
because of the inadequacy of local government tax resources, which
justifies Federal financing for items of universal noncompetitive nature
such as air pollution. Opf.imality requires additional subsidy by the
local units since many community externalities are not national in scope.
7. The practice of determining subsidies by the amount of the
deficit is unfortunate, as it either eliminates pressure toward efficiency
if the entire deficit is covered or leads to deterioration of service if not.
8. The danger of efficiency loss is less with partial Federal sub-
sidies to local government-owned enterprises; this constitutes an
important argument for operation by local or state government authorities
Such authorities should have their own taxing powers.
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